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ARTICLES

VOICE IN GOVERNMENT: THE PEOPLE
EMILY CALHOUN*

"To maintain its legitimacy, a democracy must have both a
unitary and an adversary face." Jane Mansbridge, Beyond
Adversary Democracy 300 (1983).
INTRODUCTION

This article contributes to the effort to delineate a proper
relationship between the First Amendment and the political process. In an earlier article, I explored the idea that many voting
rights cases could be better explained as First Amendment
"speech" cases than as equal protection "discrimination" cases.'
The symposium on Voice in Government offers an opportunity
to investigate whether the voice protected by the First Amendment encompasses more than the speech interests discussed in
my earlier article.
I argue that the Petitions Clause of the First Amendment
does protect a voice different from-but complementary ofmere speech. The voice protected by the Petitions Clause consists of speech synthesized and transformed through the
processes of government. It is individual in its origins, but is ultimately collective in its weight, import, and resonance. One
might think of it-in common parlance-as the voice of the
people. 2
© Copyright 1993 Emily Calhoun, Professor of Law, University of
Colorado.
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. Emily Calhoun, The First Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights
Controversies, 52 TENN. L. REv. 549 (1985).
2. It is important for readers to understand at the outset that I am
making a different argument than that made by people like Stephen L. Carter,
Does the First Amendment Protect More Than Free Speech?, 33 Wm. & MARY L. REv.
871 (1992). Carter argues that the First Amendment protects debate in a
relatively homogeneous community. Id. at 892. For that reason, and in the
interest of "repairing bonds of community," he suggests that the First
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The Petitions Clause protects the adversarial assertion of
individual, special interests in the marketplace of ideas through
familiar free speech principles, but the Petitions Clause should
not be interpreted merely to guarantee a right of speech. A Petitions Clause analysis based solely on the right of speech-and the
adversarial assumptions and metaphors associated with that
right-are inappropriately limiting for a provision of the First
Amendment 3that is said by the Court to be "a charter for
government."
The Petitions Clause is premised on assumptions about government itself that are at odds with those on which the specialinterest, adversarial, marketplace of ideas is based. The government contemplated by the Petitions Clause-the government to
which petitions for redress of grievances are directed and the
government that will or will not take action-is a government
whose charter has two fundamental features. Because these features enlist adversarial speech in service of a common end, a
voice of the people is made possible.
The first feature of the charter for government secured by
the Petitions Clause is accountability. The Petitions Clause
embodies a certain distrust of representative government and
contemplates some direct citizen access to and control of government. Accountability-an idea associated with popular sovereignty and reciprocity between government and citizen-ensures
that the will of the people cannot be ignored by self-serving government officials or officials unduly influenced by special
interests.
The second feature of the charter for government secured
by the Petitions Clause is the protection of minority interests.
Amendment may support the elimination of some voices from debate. Id. at
887.
I am not an advocate of controlling or limiting speech in the interest of
some predetermined communitarian value. I am an advocate of ensuring that
government forums accommodate diverse citizen-speakers to enter into
transactions for the benefit of the common good (i.e., the community). I am
interested in structures that promote community thinking for the general good.
I do not assume that relative homogeneity among debaters is needed in order
for people with radically diverse views to enter into transactions for the
common good.
My views are akin to those expressed in Frank Michelman, Law's Republic,
97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). Michelman thinks of "politics as a process in which
private-regarding 'men' become public-regarding citizens and thus members of
a people." Id. at 1502. He rejects the idea that republicanism requires
homogeneity or that the goal of politics is only to select winners and losers
among competing ideas.
3. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, reh'g denied, 323 U.S. 819 (1945).
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The Petitions Clause provides access to government for ideas or
groups that would otherwise be ignored by majority-endorsed
laws and policies. It gives even those not entitled to vote some
political access and an opportunity to be part of pacts created to
serve the common good. It complements and reinforces the protections for minority interests that some believe inhere in a representative system of government.
These are not the majoritarian and counter-majoritarian features that typically come to mind when we think about the fundaGovernment
mental characteristics of our government.
at
necessarily
accountability to the people, for example, is not
minority
or
to
to
individuals
responsibility
government
odds with
groups. Both features characterize a government that is controlled by no interest-special or majoritarian-that would preclude transactions among the people for the benefit of all.
The Petitions Clause guards against a government, granted
powers to serve the common good, which would choose to hear
and respond to only some of the people. It guards against a government that would exclude some individuals from deliberations
about the common good, and thereby prevent the people from
making pacts among themselves that otherwise might be made.
It guards against a government that would systematically ignore
interests or speech needed to formulate policies for the common
good. It guards against a government-majoritarian or nonmajoritarian, special-interest-that would obstruct the possibility
that a voice of the people might emerge through government.
The charter for government secured by the Petitions Clause
requires protection of two sets of interests. One is surely the set
of free speech interests typically protected through application of
a traditional free speech analysis to Petitions Clause claims. The
free-speech aspect of Petitions Clause doctrine is appropriately
responsive to the reality of how conflicting interests contend
within the political process.
But the Petitions Clause embodies more than a purely adversarial view of politics. Through its guarantees, it creates conditions under which government can be responsive and
accountable to all of the people. It creates conditions that maximize opportunities for a common voice to emerge from and to
transcend adversary, free speech advocacy. In other words, the
charter for government protects transactional as well as speech
interests. Petitions Clause principles that protect these transactional interests are not well defined. Because there is no general
acknowledgment that the Clause protects a voice of the people as
well as adversarial free speech, the Clause is frequently considered superfluous or redundant.
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The analysis in this article is offered in the hope of achieving
a better constitutional balance between the reality of competing
interests advanced by individual speech and the aspiration that
there are opportunities for discovering in that speech-if government structures are not molded to preclude those opportunities-a voice of the people for the common good.4 It draws on
Alexander Meiklejohn's argument that the paramount value
advanced by the First Amendment is planning for the general
good, an endeavor which requires protection against "mutilation
of the thinking process of the community."5 It accepts the procedural notion advanced by some advocates of civic republicanism
that politics is not "coercive communitarianism" 6 but an "opportunity for citizens to participate in a communal dialogue that
identifies the common good."7 It assumes that a primary privilege of citizenship is the ability to associate and to enter into
pacts with others for common ends.8
To explore and illustrate my argument, I will first review
some Petitions Clause history. I then consider Supreme Court
opinions to illustrate how they suggest a rationale for protecting
transactional as well as speech interests through the Petitions
Clause. Next, I turn to a contemporary Petitions Clause debate
about a Colorado constitutional provision, popularly known as
Amendment 2, to illustrate the importance of articulating Petitions Clause protections for both speech and transactional interests. Finally, I identify a principle of non-corruption that might
be used to protect the transactional interests at stake in Petitions
Clause cases.
I.

THE PETITIONS CLAUSE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A number of persons have reviewed the origins and historical appeals to the protection of the Petitions Clause.' It is not my
4. Cf Michelman, supra note 2, at 1535 (discussing the reconciliation of
principles of autonomy and association in government and constitutionalism).
"5.

'ALEXANDER

GOVERNMENT 26

6.

MEIKLEJOHN,

FREE

SPEECH

AND

ITS

RELATION

TO

SELF-

(1948).

Michelman, supra note 2, at 1495.

7. Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political
Community, 80 GEo. LJ. 1835, 1836 (1992). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548-51 (1988).
8. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1503 (citizenship permits participation as
an equal in public affairs in pursuit of a common good) and at 1518
(citizenship stands for the constant redetermination by the people for
themselves of the terms on which they live together).
9. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD & BiiL E. SHULTZ, DOCUMENTS ON THE
STATE-WIDE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1912); THOMAS E. CRONIN,
DIRECT DEMOCRACY- THE POLITICS OF INrrIATIVE,

REFERENDUM,

AND RECALL
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intent here to repeat their detailed historical accounts. Nor
should my brief comments on history be taken as an attempt to
construct an interpretation of the Petitions Clause that is
founded on a definitive and undisputed historical account.
Rather, I simply want to highlight four points which most of
these accounts suggest are valid: (1) the Petitions Clause is associated with the notion that the government (direct or representative) acts for the common good; (2) the Petitions Clause protects
speech interests; (3) the Petitions Clause protects transactional
interests; and (4) political structures and processes have changed
in significant ways since the Petitions Clause was adopted, a fact
that may bear on the way the Clause is interpreted.
A.

The Petitions Clause and the Common Good

The Petitions Clause is frequently discussed in conjunction
with a debate over two competing notions about the constitutionally-preferred character of government in the United States.
These competing notions are that government is necessarily representative or, conversely, that a government in which the people
are sovereign requires processes of direct democracy. James
Madison is typically cited as the proponent of the first idea and
Thomas Jefferson as the proponent of the second.
The representative/direct democracy debate, although providing information critical to an understanding of the Petitions
Clause, can obscure a point of agreement between key proponents of these contending ideas. Both Madison and Jefferson,
for example, believed that government should act on behalf of
all of the people, not merely the people who happen to be in
control of government at the time (be they kings or elected
majorities). Both, although in different contexts, associated the
petition for redress of grievances with this idea.
Petitioning was linked to Madison's beliefs about representative government and the common good in a rather straightforward way. Madison drafted the Petitions Clause.' 0 He defended
(1989); Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government
for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986); Anita Hodgkiss, Petitioning
and the Empowerment Theory of Practice,96 YALE L.J. 569 (1987); Norman B. Smith,
"ShallMake No Law Abridging... ":An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute,
Right of Petition,54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1153, 1166-75 (1986); Note, A Petition Clause
Analysis of Suits Against the Government: Implications for Rule 11 Sanctions, 106
HAuv. L. Riv. 1111, 1113 (1993).
10. Madison's draft of what came to be the First Amendment read:
"freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to the Government
for redress of grievances, shall not be infringed." Smith, stpra note 9, at 1175.
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its guarantees as preferable to a proposed constitutional provision that would have required representatives to vote as
instructed by the electorate." His defense was premised on a
trusteeship view of government in which representatives "owed
their constituents mature judgment and enlightened conscience"
in service of the common good, an obligation which required
that representatives have discretion to exercise their judgment
after deliberation and debate.1 2
As interpreter for the general public of the meaning of the
Constitution, Madison had a lot to say about these ideas. He
clearly believed in representative democracy as a guard against
potential dangers of majority rule and as a mechanism for promoting the common good."3 He believed it would minimize the
divisive forces of faction, 4 which he defined as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."' 5 He
rejected a pluralist or adversarial view of politics in which interests compete to be the winner. 6 Rather, he wanted to neutralize
7
factional interests so that the public interest might emerge.'
Jefferson was also a believer in the common good. In part,
Jefferson's ideas about the common good were based on moralsense philosophy and the idea of public virtue.'" They were also
arguably related to a concept of government-as-trustee similar to
11. See CRONIN, supra note 9, at 24-25; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILl. OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1026 (1971); GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 42-43, 223-24 (1981) [hereinafter WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA]; Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503,
1523 (1990).
12. See, CRONIN, supra note 9, at 27 (Edmund Burke was the "intellectual
godfather of the trustee or independence position").
13. See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 9, at 7-20, 40; WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA,
supra note 12, at 213-14; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1558-59; cf Akhil R. Amar,
The Bill of Rights as Constitution, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99 (1992)
(government structures were intended to protect individual fights); Eule, supra
note 11, at 1530 (Bill of Rights is a fallback protection for filtering systems gone
awry).
14. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA, supra note 11, at 214.
15. Id. at 193-94.

16.
17.
18.

Id. at 202.
Id. at 205-07.
GARRY

WILLS,

INVENTING

AMERICA:

JEFFERSON'S

DECLARATION

OF

INDEPENDENCE 190, 215-16, 251-55 (1978) [hereinafter WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA]. Madison also shared some of these beliefs. Id. at 236, 305. The ideas
of civic republicanism that have recently been much debated attest to this

orientation. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1560-61.
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that which influenced Madison.19 In Jefferson's view, government is to act for the general public good and abuses its powers if
it acts in a partial or self-serving manner.2"
When it came to discussing the working relationship
between governed and government, Jefferson understood
that Locke relied on the analogy of equitable trust, not
contract.... The right of the people to create and abolish
governments was analogous to their right to create and
abolish a trust for their own benefit. The inherent and inalienable
rights Jefferson cited were the terms of that
2
trust. '

The concept of government trusteeship familiar to Jefferson
rested on analogies to the trust concepts developed through
courts of equity. 22 Courts of equity were enjoined to do "equal
right to all manner of people, great and small, high and low,
right and poor ....,

In doing so, these courts worked in the

interstices of the law to respond to those who would otherwise be
omitted from legal concepts of justice and fairness. 24 And these
25
courts were interested in communal justice.
Jefferson's commitment to the idea of trusteeship and the
common good was directly associated with petitioning the government for redress of grievances. His assertion of popular sovereignty in the Declaration of Independence 26 in form and
19. Compare PETER L. HOFFER, THE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1990) with

LAW'S

WILtS,

CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE
INVENTING AMERICA, supra

note 18, at 167-81, 229-30 (arguing thatJefferson did not rely on Locke's ideas,
but interprets Locke's ideas very differently than does Hoffer).
20. HOFFER, supra note 19, at 66-71. The concept of government-astrustee was widely accepted and incorporated into state charters of government
after the Revolution. Id. at 78-79.
21. Id. at 73. Note, however, thatJefferson did not include as an inherent
right the right of property, as one would have expected from Locke. See WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA, supra note 18, at 229-30.
22. HOFFER, supra note 19, at 71-79.
23. Id. at 81 (quoting W.W. HENING, ED., STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA

(Richmond, 1809-23), 9:389 (1777)).
24. Id. at 8-10, 16.
25. Id. at 14.
26. Jefferson, along with others among the Founding Fathers, was
somewhat less enamored than Madison of the argued virtues of representative
democracy. He seemed to have more faith than Madison in the ability of the
people to represent themselves and more concern for the ability of the people
directly to control their own destiny. See, e.g., BEARD & SHULTZ, supra note 9, at
26-29; CRONIN, supra note 9, at 7-20, 25; Eule, supra note 11, at 1530.
Contemporary debate mirrors the differences of opinion between Jefferson

and Madison in this regard. Some persons believe that Madison's assumptions
about representative democracy are so far removed from reality as to be
unworthy of serious discussion. BEARD & StiULTZ, supra note 9, at 32-33. Others
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language draws on the tradition of equity. 7 For Jefferson, the
British government's refusal to respond to repeated, prior petitions for redress of colonial grievances constituted a breach of
trust obligations that was ground for dissolution of the trust and
government itself.2 8 In fact, the statement of grievances,
"applied to a private trustee, might have sustained a complaint in
chancery."29
Madison and Jefferson shared a commitment to an idea of
government for the benefit of all of the people rather than a
particular special interest. In different contexts, each linked the
petition for redress of grievance to the notion that government
find contemporary validation
ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1983).

for his views.

JANE MANSBRIDGE,

BEYOND

On the other hand, contemporary proponents of representative
democracy invoke Madison to argue that direct democracy is either
constitutionally suspect or invalid. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 11; see also Douglas
H. Hsiao, Invisible Cities: The Constitutional Status of Direct Democracy in a
Democratic Republic, 41 DuKE L.J. 1267 (1992); Hans E. Linde, Wien Initiative
Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government'. The Campaign Against Homosexuality,
72 OR. L. REv. 19 (1993).
Although my Petitions Clause analysis shares many of the views expressed
by proponents of representative democracy, I do not assume that representative
processes necessarily are more rational or more immune to special interests
than direct democracy. Neither do I assume the contrary. The Petitions Clause
analysis assumes that all forms of government present the danger (although
certainly in different degrees) that government will either be captured by
special interest or ignore minority interests. It proposes that all forms of
government should be evaluated by their capacity to permit transactions among
citizens for the common good.
For example, the trusteeship idea is not necessarily restricted to
representative forms of democracy, see CRONIN, supra note 9, at 39 (citing
Rousseau), and does not preclude direct democracy. Cf Minnesota State Bd.
for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) (rejecting a
constitutional claim for direct citizen participation in government policymaking), which should not be read to mandate representative decisionmaking
but rather as a determination that direct participation is not constitutionally
required. Cf Am. Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, No. 93-1467 (D. Colo.
filed July 14, 1993), which argues that the state's initiative process is a
formalized/codified version of the right of petition embodied in the First
Amendment and should be given special protection. This article does not
address the strength of claims that, once a state has established a process for
direct citizen participation, that process is given special First Amendment
protections.

27. See Wiues, INVrrINc AMERICA, supra note 18, at 57-65 (Jefferson
treated the first Congress as a committee for petition of redress); see also, Smith,
supra note 9, at 1156 (describing how petitions were associated with the concept
of equity).
28. HOFFER, supra note 19, at 66.

29.

Id. at 73-74.
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for the benefit of all the people is required by a concept of government trusteeship.
-B.

The Petitions Clause and Speech Interests

In the original view, protecting speech interests was seen as a
way of protecting other interests served by the Petitions Clause." °
For example, speech was critical to the ability of petitioners to
use the petition device to control legislative agendas, to bring
problems to the attention of government, or to provide information to government."
In practical terms, however, the Petitions Clause has come to
be associated primarily with free and equal speech. This is a natural consequence of the fact that many prominent government
reactions against unwanted petitioning against private and public
injustice have taken the form of penalties and restrictions on
speech. 32 For example, government attempts to impose restrictions on speech about labor or civil rights issues have been
resisted through claims based on the Petitions Clause.3 3
The early link made between the right of petition and the
protection of speech is commonly associated with the adoption
of the Sedition Act of 1798, which criminalized "false, scandalous
and malicious writings against the government of the United
States, or either House of Congress... or the President... with
intent to defame . . . or to bring them . . . into contempt or
disrepute."3 4 The link was carried into contemporary conscious30. See Higginson, supra note 9, at 142 (noting that Madison saw the two
rights as separate and distinct and presented them in different amendments in
his original draft); Smith, supra note 9, at 1153 (recognition of petitioning as an
unqualified right helped to foster recognition of fights of press and assembly
and other speech rights). According to Sheldon Novick, some widely consulted
commentaries like JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1873), and
THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (1868), were "far more strongly
worded when they came to the right of petition than they were concerning the
right of free speech more generally." Sheldon M. Novick, The Unrevised Holmes
and Freedom of Expression, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 303, 333 n.135,
31. For examples of how petitioning was used, see Higginson, supra note
9 and Smith, supra note 9.
32. See, e.g., the early litigation involving petitions and libel actions.
Higginson, supra note 9, at 149 (describing punishments of petitioners who got
out of line); Hodgkiss. supranote 9, at 573 n.22; Smith, supranote 9, at 1168-75
(discussing eighteenth-century prosecutions for treason and seditious libel).
33. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1940); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, reh'g denied, 323 U.S. 819
(1945). See generally infra notes 48-51, 103-07, 113-16, 12146, 152-64, 177-80 and
accompanying text.
34. 1 Stat. 596 (1798). Seventeen cases were prosecuted under the Act
before it expired in 1801, and popular indignation over the Act contributed
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ness in the case of Ne) York Times Co. v. Sullivan3 5 and other similar cases.3 6
C.

The Petitions Clause and TransactionalInterests

Speech interests have not always predominated in debates
implicating the Petitions Clause. The assumption that the Petitions Clause involves much more than speech interests, for example, was a focal point of the 1836 debate on Senator John C.
Calhoun's motion not to receive three petitions requesting Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.3 7
On a conceptual level, the senatorial debate invoked the
ideas of government for the common good to which Jefferson
and Madison were committed. Debate on Calhoun's motion
implicated the responsibility of government to act for the common good, in ways that would not divide the country. All debaters professed to share this common frame of reference, although
they disagreed as to what action-receipt or rejection of the abolitionist petitions-would serve the ends. 8
For example, some argued that the abolitionist petitions
should not be received because of the divisive nature of their substance.3 9 Others responded that to refuse the petitions would be
inherently divisive, as denying a basic political right of petition
that pre-existed the formation of the government itself.4" Still
others reminded the Senate that, in considering whether to
receive or reject the petitions, senators were bound to act for the
substantially to the demise of the Federalist Party. See Smith, supra note 9, at
1175-77.
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); see also Novick,
supra note 30, at 330-47 (discussing the sedition cases of the early twentieth
century).
37. For a review of the many debates respecting abolitionist petitions, see
Higginson, supra note 9, at 158-65.
38. The main speeches recorded in the Congressional Globe are replete
with appeals to senators to debate and decide on the petitions in ways that will
serve the common good. See CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 75-80, 233-35
(1836); CONG. GLOBE APP., 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 87-93, 108-12, 117-22, 132-36,
138-40, 140-42, 14244, 147-50, 167-70, 181-85, 214-17, 218-20, 220-23, 223-26,
271-73, 291-93, 299-300, 321-23, 619-620 (1836).
39. This objection was one of the bases for Calhoun's original motion not
to receive the Ohio petition. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 38, at 75, 81. The
objection was echoed by other southern senators. Id. at 76, 118; CONG. GLOBE
Apr., supra note 38, at 144, 220-22, 321. See also id. at 223-26.
40. This view was expressed by senators from both northern and southern
states. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, supra note 38, at 79, 120-23; CONG. GLOBE APP.,

supra note 38, at 48, 88, 90, 92, 111, 140-41, 149, 182, 185, 214, 234, 272.

1994]

VOICE IN GOVERNMENT: THE PEOPLE

common good.4 ' Others refined the latter notion: the petitioners deserved a respectful response rather than rejection precisely
because they must, as citizens, be considered part of the common
good.4 2
Within the debate's professed frame of reference-that government is chartered to act on behalf of the common goodsenators engaged in a vigorous debate about which people would
be allowed to participate in the transactions and processes from
which the common good would be derived. The right to petition
was seen by some as inseparable from a duty of government to
receive and respond to petitions.43 Senators were reminded that
they were agents of the people and that they required petitions
in order to fulfill their responsibilities to the people. 4 It was
argued that infringing the right of petition would change the
vital spirit of the Senate as a political institution.4 5 The Petitions
Clause was said to protect a free and unobstructed intercourse
between government and people, not merely a one-way avenue
for speech.4 6
Appeals to transactional interests and the responsibility of
government to all the people-rather than assertions of rights of
41. These appeals are made throughout the speeches cited in supra note
39. Some, for example, argued for the need for a unified vote. CONG. GLOBE,
supra note 38, at 76, 241-42, 247-48. Others argued that the senators and their
constituents should respect the original pact (and compromises on slavery) on
which the Union was founded and should recall the common interests and
bonds forged in the Revolutionary War. Id. at 77, 79, 80; CONG. GLOBE App.,
supra note 38, at 110, 111,134, 140, 182. Again, others argued that the best way
to show unity was to reach the merits of the abolitionist petitions so that
northern and southern senators together could vote to deny them. CONG.
GLOBE,

supra note 38, at 239;

CONG. GLOBE

Ae., supra note 38, at 121-22, 218,

239, 620. One senator argued that citizens effectively lost their right to have a
petition received when they petitioned for divisive purposes. CONG. GLOBE
APP., supra note 38, at 322-23.
42. Id. at 83, 638.
43. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 38, at 147, 336; CONG. GLOBE App., supra
note 38, at 108-11, 122-23, 183, 218, 234, 618. See Hodgkiss, supra note 9;
Higginson, supra note 9, at 155 n.92 (arguing that the Petitions Clause imposes
a constitutional, inescapable duty to respond on the part of government.)
ContraSmith, supra note 9, at 1179 n.164, 1190. Cf Note, supra note 9, at 111922 (arguing that the government owes a duty to respond); Comment, On Letting
the Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unauthorized PracticeRules, 132 U. PA. L.
Rs,. 1515, 1518 (1984).
44. CONG. GLOBE App., supra note 38, at 122, 133-34, 169, 182, 300.
45. Id. at 182.
46. Id. at 148, 149. See also id. at 133 (people enjoy more than the mere
liberty of hearing the senate's voice); CONG. GLOBE, supra note 38, at 239 (the
right of petition is a right of being heard, which carries with it a right to have
the servants of the people examine, deliberate, decide, and to give reasons for
its decisions).
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free speech-characterized this part of the debate. The debate
was about who was entitled to enjoy the reciprocal relationship
between government and people, and about who was entitled to
enter into the transactional setting from which the common
good would emerge.4 7
Ostensibly, this part of the debate was about the petitioners,
who were not slaves but members of the Society of Friends or
other groups opposing slavery. In reality, however, as all Senators knew, the debate was about African-Americans themselves
and their status as citizens. The debate was about whether interests of African-Americans could be asserted through the petition,
a device intended to ensure that government would not neglect
its obligation to act-and to enter into pacts-for the benefit of
all people.
Slavery as an institution was justified, in part, with reference
to the assertion that African-Americans were incapable of discerning the common good and, for that reason, they could be
excluded from participation in government constituted for the
common good.4 8 As was said by Justice Daniel in Dred Scott v.
Sanford,4 9 slaves can "be no party to... the association of those
possessing free will, power, [and] discretion."50 As a practical
matter, preservation of the institution of slavery was secured by
maintaining barriers that effectively precluded pacts from being
made even among African-Americans themselves.51
It is no wonder that defenders of slavery feared that mere
reception of the 1836 and similar petitions would threaten the
foundations of slavery. Receipt of the petitions would acknowledge-even though only indirectly-the right of African Americans to demand inclusion in the common good. Receipt of the
petitions would acknowledge a transactional right of African
Americans to be part of processes of political exchange through
47. A central aspect ofJefferson's philosophy was that development of the
common interest required mechanisms of exchange. WILLS, IrVENTING

AMERICA, supra note 18, at 231-35 (arguing that the right to alienate property
was more important to the moral sense philosophers than the right to retain
property).

48. Feldman, supra note 7, at 1852-53. See also, Sunstein, supra note 7, at
1539-40 (discussing the fact that republicanism is associated with exclusion).
49. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 477 (1856).
50.

Id.

51.

See, e.g., ROBERT FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE
AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 396-400 (1989) (family members were physically
separated from each other, education was restricted, slaves were not permitted
to engage in or even to speak of collective action, opportunities to develop a
collective sense of history were removed).
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which pacts among the people would be formed for the benefit
of all the people.
D.

The Petitions Clause and Contemporary Political Structures

As historical accounts of the Petitions Clause demonstrate,
contemporary political structures and processes differ in many
ways from those that existed at the time the Petitions Clause was
adopted. For example, the franchise has been widely conferred
on previously disqualified groups. 2 The power of the judiciary
to protect minority interests against majoritarian excess has been
expanded. Mechanisms for promoting direct democracy, like
the initiative,
referendum, and recall, have been adopted by
5
many states.
These changes may affect what we think about competing
forms of representative or direct democracy,5 4 but they do not
affect the contemporary urgency of the historical Petitions
Clause concern for a charter of government that permits a voice
of the people to emerge from adversarial interests.5 5 That concern is even more urgent as both representative and direct democratic processes come to serve primarily adversarial interests and
therefore tend to work against the charter of government guaranteed by the Petitions Clause. 6 Contrary to what some may
think,5 7 we are "starved for [the ]unitary democracy" 8 that the
52.

Petitioning was not restricted to qualified voters and, in fact, was

viewed as a necessary political mechanism given the limited electoral franchise.
Higginson, supra note 9, at 145, 153; Smith, supra note 9, at 1172.

53.

CRONIN,

54.

For example,. some might question whether direct democracy is

supra note 9, at 47.

practically wise. Eule, supra note 11. Compare what happened to the practice
of petitioning itself when legislatures became flooded with abolitionist

petitions, each demanding some action. Higginson, supra note 9, at 158.
55. Cf Higginson, supra note 9, at 165-66 (suggesting that changed
conditions might warrant a different approach to petitioning, but calling for
candor in interpretations of the Clause).

56. Direct democracy typically is adversarial in orientation, at least in its
purest forms. See, e.g., MANSBRIDCE, supra note 26, at 245, 301. Many persons
seem to believe that representative government will only be legitimate and
effectively respond to non-majority interests if it is conceived along adversarial
lines. Stnstein, supra note 7, at 1585-89, presents an argument that
proportional representation, which is frequently characterized as an adversarial
approach to representative government, actually is a device that serves the
common good by ensuring that minorities at least have a voice in representative
deliberations.
57. E.g., WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA, supra note 11, at 234 (cautioning
that the commitment to public virtue and government officials who act for the
common good seems "sappy" to twentieth-century individuals).

58.

MANSBRIDGE,

supra note 26, at 301.
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transactional interests of the Petitions Clause were intended to
promote.
II.

59
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PETITIONS CLAUSE

Although relevant Supreme Court opinions are read by
some to stand for the proposition that the guarantees of the Petitions Clause are equivalent to-no more and no less than-free
speech guarantees,6 ° the Court has stated that rights of speech/
press and petition/assembly are not identical.6" The Court simply has not had many occasions to elaborate on how speech and
petitioning rights differ. Because most Petitions Clause claims
focus on speech rather than transactional interests, only a speech
component of Petitions Clause analysis has been fully developed.
The speech component does resemble free speech analysis, but
even in Petitions Clause opinions focusing on speech interests
the Court has indicated that the Clause protects something different from a right of free speech.6 2 One element that differenti59. The Court's Petitions Clause opinions are few and far between. The
opinions discussed in this article include those directly based on Petitions
Clause analysis and those merely referring to the Clause as embodying concepts
and policies relevant to the analysis of other provisions of law. See McDonald v.
Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985); Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v.
Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S.
731 (1983); Smith v. Arkansas Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463
(1979); California Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, reh'g denied, 365 U.S. 875
(1961); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, reh'g denied 323 U.S. 819 (1945);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Most opinions do not
go into the history of the Clause or its purposes in any depth. But see McDonald
v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49 n.2 (1966)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (offering a somewhat more complete analysis of the
purposes of the Petitions Clause).
60. See Smith, supra note 9, at 1183-88; Note, supra note 9, at 1111-12.
61. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 530. In Thomas, which involved both
speech and petition/assembly claims but focused on speech interests, the Court
suggested that the usual requirement of strict scrutiny of restrictions on speech
may be even more important when the speech claim is associated with an
assembly claim. Id. Typically, however, the Court states that free speech and
petition rights are cognate, thereby implying equality of status of rights. See,
e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). In one instance, the Court has
explicitly rejected an argument that speech to government ought to be given
greater, Petitions Clause immunity from defamation actions than ordinary
speech is given under the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment.
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985). Smith, supra note 9, questions this
decision.
62. Throughout this article, the term "speech right" is used to refer to
speech that does not implicate the Petitions Clause and that is protected only
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ates free speech guarantees from petitioning guarantees is the
Court's concern for non-adversarial transactional interests.
A.

The Non-Market TransactionalContext

In Petitions Clause cases, one indication that the Court differentiates free speech guarantees from petitioning guarantees is
that the Court does not locate speech solely in the context of an
adversarial marketplace of ideas where it is expected and desired
that the best ideas should win. There is a transactional context
in Petitions Clause cases, but it is not the transactional context of
the marketplace.
The move away from a marketplace metaphor is most evident in Thomas v. Collins,63 in which the Court explained that the
Petitions Clause protects more than speech for the sake of
debate, the development of knowledge, or philosophical discussion of abstract principles.6 4 The Clause does not exist solely for
persons engaged in intellectual pursuits.6 5 Rather, the Clause is

by the speech/press provisions of the First Amendment. The term "speech
interest" is used to refer to the set of interests protected by the petition right of
the First Amendment. My intent is to maintain a distinction between the right
that protects speech and the right that protects petitioning, an activity that
implicates both speech and transactional interests.
63. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). In Thomas, the move away from the metaphor is
relatively direct. In other cases, it is more subtle. See, e.g., Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), in which the metaphor was explicitly rejected
for use in discussions of some petitioning by dissenting Justice Frankfurter, id.
at 279, and implicitly by the majority. Justice Frankfurter argued that the
claimed right of private parties and the press to comment on an on-going
judicial proceeding should not be resolved by relying on a marketplace
metaphor. Id. at 283 ("a trial is not a 'free trade in ideas,' nor is the best test of
truth in a courtroom 'the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market'"). But see id. at 293 (a marketplace metaphor is
appropriate for discussing speech in the democratic political process). The
majority disagreed with Frankfurter's conclusions about the merits of the
constitutional claim, but it avoided a marketplace metaphor to help resolve the
claim. The majority never adverted to the marketplace metaphor as a
justification for protecting petitioning speech, but it provided no substitute
metaphor. Cf Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983)
(petitioning activity was actually conducted in court and a stronger sense of a
marketplace metaphor characterizes the opinion).
64. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 535. Compare to the concurring
opinion of justice Jackson, which does link the protection of speech to ideas
associated with the marketplace metaphor. Id. at 545-46 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
65. Id. at 537.
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a charter for government; 66 speech under the Clause is directed
toward government action.67
Other than the idea that the Petitions Clause constitutes a
charter for government, there is in the Petitions Clause decisions
no easily identifiable or neatly contrived metaphor that explicitly
takes precedence over that of the marketplace-of-ideas. 68 But the
marketplace metaphor is subordinated to non-adversarial transactional concerns. These non-adversarial transactional concerns
are revealed in the descriptive context in which the Court locates
speech.
According to the Court's Petitions Clause decisions, speech
to government officials is protected because government
requires speech to act accountably and effectively.69 Effective
and intelligent popular government depends on speech.70
Speech is an important aspect of self-government 7' and is
required if representative government is to work. 72 The Petitions
Clause gives government officials the ability to receive informa73
tion from all sources so that they can fulfill their obligations.
The Petitions Clause protects speech so as to ensure that the
people can make their will known to the government and government can be responsive to that will. 74 The Court invokes the
concept of the people's will on behalf of speakers holding
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Novick says that Justice Brennan's opinion in New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), provides an alternative metaphor of a town
meeting of equals, Novick, supra note 30, at 377 ("Brennan's vision was of a
community of equals: a town meeting."), but the metaphor is not fully
developed in that case.
69. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. at 365 (speech serves peaceful change);
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at
137 (speech of the two competing parties is directed toward government
action); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 510.
70. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 530.
71. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. at 483.
72. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 545-46 (Jackson, J., concurring).
73. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 277.
74. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (speech and
assembly are protected so that government can be responsive to the will of the
people and peaceful change can occur); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 137-39 (the whole concept of
representative government depends on the ability of the people to make their
wishes known so government can act on behalf of the people); California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 510 (quoting Noerr); Dejonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. at 365 (petitioning maintains "the opportunity for free
political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people").
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demonstrably non-majoritarian or special-interest views.75 The
Petitions Clause decisions suggest that-by definition-a will of
the people cannot be formed if some speakers are excluded from
government processes and public debate, even if those speakers
demonstrably cannot command adherence of a majority of citizens to their views. They embody a concept of a will of the people that transcends adversarial minority, special, or even majority
interests.7 6
According to the Court, the Petitions Clause protects the
assertion of minority views as a vehicle for peaceful change, 7 as a
way of kindling public interest in new issues, 78 and as a means of
ensuring that changed conditions of society will not be neglected
by government. 79 It serves as a check on a government that
might otherwise seek to limit the search for knowledge or to
become the dogmatic guardian of the public mind." °
Petitioning is a right of all citizens because government has
the power to act for the benefit of the common good and to
require all citizens (not simply the majority who voted for an
75. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (special interests); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (minority interests as against
majority-endorsed laws). In fact, there are no Petitions Clause cases in which
plaintiffs claim to represent a majority of voters whose will has been ignored by
a legislative body.
76. The "will of the people" protects people with extreme minority or
special-interest views that not only will not "win" in a political contest conducted
at the moment of decision but, in all probability, will never be accepted by a
majority. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365,
379 (1991) (it would be hard to sustain restrictions on citizen advocacy of any
form of governmental action, however disfavored, in light of the Petitions
Clause). Thus, the Court's "will of the people" is something more than a mere
artifact of accessible procedures through which majority preferences are
registered. It is, in this respect, at odds with how people conventionally
understand the concept. The conventional will of the people is typically
considered to be no more and no less than a majority preference (selfinterested or not) on a particular issue. The Petitions Clause "will of the
people" is something other than a descriptive label identifying the outcome of a
particular electoral competition.
77. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 68 (1964); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. at 353, 365; see
also Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. at 741 (petitioning to courts is
linked to peaceful resolution of disputes); cf. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 42021 (1988) (limitations on initiative petitioning, which is said to serve peaceful
change, are discussed in terms of free speech rights).
78. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 268-69; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
at 366.
79. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 532.
80. Id. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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action) to contribute to that action."1 It is a necessary, reciprocal
incident of citizenship in a government that acts for the common
good.8 2
The Petitions Clause protects the ability of people to persuade others to join cause with them." Rights of assembly are
intertwined with the discussion of petitioning rights.8 4 The right
to discuss matters of public interest is protected not only as part
of free speech but as part of free assembly.85 Both are inherent
in citizenship."
Speech under the Petitions Clause is said to be "communication with one another which constitutes the basis of all common
achievement."" Petitioning speech is linked to the right to consult with others respecting public affairs.8 8 Speech serves the
ability of people to enter into transactions with other people,
which is important to government and to citizenship. 9
It would be a mistake to read too much into the Court's frequently cryptic statements about the Petitions Clause and petitioning speech. But it would be an equal mistake to ignore the
Court's repeated placement of speech in a non-adversarial context. In Petitions Clause decisions, speech is linked to effective,
81. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867).
82. Id. at 43-45. The requirement of reciprocity between government and
citizen is repeated in other decisions. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at
555. It embraces all citizens, minority as well as majority. See infra notes 147-80
and accompanying text. A weaker notion of reciprocity pertains to the
information needs of government. Government needs information to act
responsibly and citizens have a right of speech to further responsible
government action. See infra notes 91-97, 109 and accompanying text.
83. In Thomas v. Collins, the speech threatened was that of a union leader
who was attempting to persuade workers to join with unionized workers. The
majority recognized this fact as a reason to protect speech. 323 U.S. at 526, 53234. See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279; California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 510-11 (petitioning protects
groups with common interests).
84. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. at 365; Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring).
85. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 532.
86. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
87. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 546 n.1 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(quoting Woodrow Wilson, Address at the Institute of France (May 10, 1919)
reprinted in SELECTED LITERARY AND POLITIcAL PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
WOODROW WILSON 333 (1926)).
88. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552; DeJonge v.Oregon, 299
U.S. at 364 (citing Cruikshank).
89. Crandall v.Nevada, 73 U.S. at 44. Arguably, the idea that petitioning
rights serve the people's ability to enter into transactions for the common good
is at the heart of the concern for peaceful change, also invoked in Petitions
Clause decisions. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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representative, and responsive government rather than to
abstract philosophical debate. Speech serves transactions for
common achievement and the formation of pacts among people
rather than a competition among citizens in which the most powerful self-interest will win. Petitioning guarantees for all citizens
are explicitly linked to the power of government to act on behalf
of, and in ways affecting, all of the people. The people to whom
government is accountable and on whose behalf government acts
are all of the people, not merely a dominant interest group. The
Court's assertions about speech and the Petitions Clause reflect a
normative view of a government chartered to act in the capacity
of trustee for the common good.9 ° They put speech in a nonadversarial context.
B.

ProceduralProtectionsfor Petitioning

Although one finds much rhetoric in the Petitions Clause
decisions placing speech in a non-adversarial context, the procedural protections afforded through the Clause seem remarkably
similar to those deemed appropriate to protect speech competing in a marketplace of ideas. Procedures ensure, for example,
equal access for all speakers and freedom from penalty or
restraint of disfavored views. Simple speech protections typically
serve the petitioner's interests because the petitioner is complaining only about restrictions or penalties on speech itself.
In two cases relevant to the Petitions Clause, however, petitioners sought protection of something other than mere speech.
In one, the Court's analysis responded adequately to the petitioners' concerns. In the other, it did not. The decisions illustrate
that, although non-adversarial transactional concerns are potentially present in Petitions Clause claims, they are not always fully
recognized. When the Court affords protections appropriate
only to an adversarial marketplace, the analysis is unsatisfactory.
90. In early Petitions Clause analysis, the idea that government is
constituted to act for the common good is tied-as it was for Madison-to
representative forms of democracy, in which representatives use their power for
the benefit of the people as a whole. E.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
at 554 (government has an obligation to all its citizens); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. at 546 (Jackson, concurring) (representatives are chosen for their
temperament, judgment, and abilities to receive and act on information from a
variety of sources, including those advocating special and minority interests).
This idea is different from the more limited idea that all branches of
government-including the legislature-have an obligation to protect the
constitutional rights of minorities as well as the interests of majorities, although
the two ideas converge when the right to petition the judiciary is at stake. See,
e.g., Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc., v.Jefferson County, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo.
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Consider, first, the decision in which non-adversarial transactional concerns were not recognized. In Minnesota State Board
for Community Colleges v. Knight,9 faculty members complained
that they were unconstitutionally excluded from exchanges of
views with college administrators by a statute requiring those
administrators to "meet and confer" only with a single designated
faculty representative. The majority treated the claim primarily
as one implicating the free speech guarantees of the First
Amendment.9 2 It therefore looked at whether the faculty plaintiffs' speech was cut off entirely or whether only one, formal
forum for speech was restricted.9" Using broad language, it concluded that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right to
direct participation in government decisionmaking, a right to
have government listen to particular advisers, or a right to have
government respond to a particular speaker.9 4 Faculty were
found to be "free to communicate to the State Board and to local
administrations their views" 95 outside the formal context of
"meet and confer" sessions,9 6 and that their
speech and associational rights... have not been infringed
by... restriction of participation in "meet and confer" sessions to the faculty's exclusive representative. The State
has in no way restrained [the plaintiffs'] freedom to speak
on any education-related issue or their freedom to associate or not to associate with whom they please, including
the exclusive representative. Nor has the State attempted
to suppress any ideas.9 7
Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the ability of the
plaintiffs to speak in other forums was not an adequate substitute
for participation in "meet and confer" sessions. 98 He noted that
college administrators wanted to meet formally with faculty other
than those for whom the exclusive statutory representative spoke
but were prohibited from doing so, regardless of the merits of
the views that might be expressed by those faculty.99 He objected
91.

465 U.S. 271 (1984).

92. The majority discussed both rights of speech and association, and
cited Smith v. Arkansas Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979), a
case which did rest on a Petitions Clause analysis, but the focus of the majority's
opinion was on speech.
93. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. at
288.
94.

Id. at 284-85, 288.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

276.
277.
288.
301, 322.
313.
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that the challenged statute gave one voice a monopoly in the formation of policy.' 0
Justice Stevens's description of the situation identified a
familiar organizational problem that went beyond speech. Complaining faculty in Minnesota were upset because they were
deprived of equal participation with other faculty in a process of
decisionmaking. They knew that their exclusion affected their
ability to be included in negotiations and compromises in which
competing views would be transformed into policy affecting all
faculty. Administrators were upset because they knew that their
ability to formulate policy responsive to the interests of all
faculty-not simply a single interest group-was compromised.
Neither complaining faculty nor administrators saw speech in
alternative forums as an adequate substitute for participation in
the policy-making forum. Their problem-maintaining a decisionmaking structure that would enable people from different
professional backgrounds, as well as strong, conflicting opinions
and considerable autonomy, to work together-required something other than a free speech analysis.
Unfortunately for the would-be petitioning faculty, the
majority saw only a speech issue. And Justice Stevans, who accurately assessed the true nature of the faculty complaint, adopted
a marketplace of ideas, free speech metaphor for use in his analysis. ' 1 That metaphor-inherently inappropriate for resolving
non-adversarial transactional claims-weakened Stevans's argument and effectively precluded an appropriate response to the
faculty's complaint.
Problems like those created by the Minnesota statute cannot
be adequately addressed by a procedural construct focused only
on the ability of people with competing views to speak about
their views and to associate to further their ends. I am not arguing here that the complaining Minnesota faculty should have
prevailed."0 2 I am simply saying that their interest in being part
of a decisionmaking forum structured to produce policies based
100. Id. at 314.
101. Id. at 314 (First Amendment guarantees "that decision[s will] be
made in an open marketplace of ideas").
102. For example, one might conclude that the decisionmaking forum
created by the Minnesota statute was more like typical employer-employee
forums for exclusive bargaining than like governmental processes by their
nature intended to serve the general welfare and the common good. If so, a
Petitions Clause charter-for-government analysis would not necessarily apply.
See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (suggesting that procedural
claims pertaining to government employer-employee relations are outside the
scope of the Petitions Clause).
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on compromise and responsive to more than one faculty group's
concerns was not-and could not be-adequately addressed
through an analysis that relied solely on a free speech, adversarial
metaphor.
In a second decision, CaliforniaMotor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,1 03 the Court implicitly acknowledged that, under
appropriate circumstances, the Petitions Clause protects interests
like those unsuccessfully asserted by the Minnesota faculty. In
CaliforniaMotor Transport,the Court was required to construe the
Clayton Act. Truckers had charged business competitors with
illegally invoking state judicial proceedings to deprive the truckers of access to state regulatory processes. The defendant competitors argued that their use of state proceedings was immune
from penalty or restraint.
The Court construed the Clayton Act to recognize an immunity defense that would be compatible with First Amendment
petition rights."0 4 It recognized that the right of petition protects the ability of people with common interests, like defendants, to "use the channels and procedures of state and federal
agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of
view..

."-5 In other words, the Petitions Clause protects adver-

sarial, special interest speech. The Court also held, however, that
adversarial, special interest speech would be protected only insofar as it did not abuse or "corrupt"
the governmental processes to
10 6
which the speech was directed.
The Court did not articulate a detailed test for determining
when petitioning speech activity would so corrupt governmental
processes that Petitions Clause speech interests would lose their
immunizing capacity. It only said that a colorable argument of
103. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983).

See also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.

104. In similar antitrust cases, the Court purports simply to construe the
federal statute so as not to attribute to Congress an intent to violate the
Petitions Clause. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In California Motor Transport, the Court
seems to rely more directly on the Petitions Clause itself, especially in the way
the Court talks about the plaintiffs and their interest in access to government.
To paraphrase the Court in CaliforniaMotor Transport, the defendants' freedom
to petition government for redress of grievances might be constitutionally
protected, but that does not mean that their freedom to keep others from
petitioning is protected. 404 U.S. at 514-15 (quoting Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
105. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at
510-11.
106. Id. at 513.
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corruption was raised by allegations that the defendants had
used their power and resources to
harass and deter [the plaintiffs'] use of administrative and
judicial proceedings so as to deny them 'free and unlimited access' to those tribunals. The result ...

was that the

machinery of the agencies and courts was effectively closed
to [plaintiffs] and [defendants] indeed became 'the regulators of the grants of rights, transfers and registrations' to
[plaintiffs]7 .
0

.

. [and] usurp[ed]

that decisionmaking

process.
Special interest usurpation of government processes might
be corruption for a variety of reasons. 0 s It might, for example,
arguably be corruption because it deprives government of information needed for action on behalf of the people. 0 9 This view
of corruption would hinge on a belief that usurpation is bad
because it interferes with speech. Because of the Court's decision in Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, however, it is difficult to see why the opportunity to speak in
unofficial forums would not be a constitutionally adequate substitute for the protection of the speech interests in CalforniaMotor
Transport. Together, the decisions in California Motor Transport
and Minnesota State Board of Education suggest that corruption of
process must entail more than mere obstruction of speech in a
particular forum.
Another possibility, consistent with the Petitions Clause concern for non-adversarial transactional interests, is that special
107. Id. at 511-12.
108. For example, in Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. at 741,
the Court, relying on California Motor Transport, held that Petition Clause
interests in private litigation consist of "compensation for violated rights and
interests, the psychological benefits of vindication, [and] public airing of
disputed facts." Id. at 743 (quoting Thomas A. Balmer, Sham Litigation and the
Antitrust Laws, 29 Burr. L. REx,. 39, 60 (1980)). If the state has recognized a
legal injury, a person has a right not to be totally deprived of the stateprescribed remedy. Id. at 742. Although these interests exist only if the statecourt plaintiff has a real grievance under state law, and there is no real
grievance if "litigation is based on intentional falsehoods or on knowingly
frivolous claims," id. at 743-44, a plaintiff must be accorded a lot of leeway in
stating his factual and legal case. Id. at 745, 746-47. In other words, a person
has a 'right of access to state judicial processes for purposes other than
vindication of speech interests, but the process right is conditioned on truthful
speech. Cf Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (intentionally false
information is not protected because it is "at odds with the premises of
democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic,
social, or political change is to be effected").
109. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at
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interest usurpation of government processes is corruption
because it affects transactional opportunities sought through
access to government agencies. Special interest usurpation is
corruption not only because it deprives others of equal speech
access to government but because government may be disabled
from including the interests of all people in the formulation of
policies that represent pacts among citizens. It is corruption
because it changes essential features of a process of government
chartered for non-adversarial ends.
This view might explain not only Calfornia Motor Transport,
but also the Court's approach to petitioning issues in cases like
Bridges v. California.1 ' In Bridges, the state argued that it should
be able to restrict speech in order to prevent disruption and disturbance of judicial processes and to preserve the dignity of the
bench. These arguments were not viewed favorably by the
Court.1" When, however, the state argued that its restrictions on
110. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Bridges is primarily a free speech decision.
Petitioning fights entered into the analysis because one of the published items
which allegedly violated an order restraining comment on an on going judicial
proceeding was originally sent as a telegram to the Secretary of Labor.
111. When a state argues that a concern for the integrity of state
processes justifies state restrictions on individual petitioning, the Court
appropriately views the argument with some skepticism. In these cases, it is
quite likely that the state is asserting its own self-interest rather than the
transactional interests of the people. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414
(1988); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, reh'g denied, 323 U.S. 819 (1945);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937). Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), is an exception to the usual
skepticism. In Adderley, the majority upheld prosecutions of individuals who
had peacefully demonstrated outside a jail. It accepted the arguments of the
state that prosecutions should be permitted to enable the state to protect public
property and to prevent disruption of an essential government function. Justice
Douglas dissented, arguing that the prosecutions offended the Petitions Clause,
id. at 49-51 & n.2, and that government should not be given the ability to decide
what persons have access to public places to air grievances. Id. at 54-55.
When an individual claims that the Petitions Clause protects the integrity
of government decisionmaking processes, there is not the same reason for
skepticism. The only case in which individuals arguably made such a direct
claim is Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271
(1984), an argument which probably did not prevail because of the employeremployee setting in which the claim was made.
Compare other cases in which a state invokes the integrity of its own
processes as ajustification for restricting speech, e.g., patronage cases like Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), in which a state argued that, because patronage
serves government efficiency and accountability, representative government,
and democratic process, it should be permitted despite its impact on political
speech and belief. See also, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in which
states attempted to justify infringements on speech by arguing that they serve
state interests. But compare cases like United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
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speech were intended to protect the transactional integrity of a
government forum and its ability to render impartial justice, the
majority-although ultimately not1 persuaded-viewed
the state's
2
argument with more seriousness.'
Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315" 3-in
which the Court rejected a procedural Petitions Clause argument-is also consistent with the possibility that the Court is concerned with corruption. In Smith, the plaintiffs challenged a state
regulation that precluded unions or other employee associations
from filing grievances on behalf of government employees;
employees were required to file on their own behalf. The Court
held that individuals have no constitutional right to require government to listen to any particular person or to respond to complaints.' 1 4 Some have read Smith as a decision that significantly
undercuts the scope and force of the Petitions Clause, 1 5 but the
Court's refusal to entertain complaints about specific modes of
procedural participation for government employees should not
be taken to reflect a decision that structures of government are
immune from constitutional scrutiny even if they run up against
Petitions Clause transactional interests. Smith simply reflects the
Court's reluctance, expressed in many other cases, to constitutionalize all aspects of the government employer-employee relationship." 6 Employer-employee relations are not a concern of
the Petitions Clause charter for government.
The Petitions Clause protects against corruption of
processes that interfere with transactional interests important to
citizens, 1 7 not procedures that affect transactional interests in
minor ways, if at all. It protects against procedures that prevent
some citizens from being part of transactional settings in which
decisions on behalf of the general welfare are made. Whereas
the discovery of "truth" requires only procedural protections for
equal, adversarial competition among speakers, preservation of
the charter of government contemplated by the Petitions Clause
requires different procedural protections. It requires protecU.S. 75 (1947), and United States Civil Sen,. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), in which a state takes a position that is
against its own self-interest.
112.
113.

Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 271.
441 U.S. 463 (1979).

114. Id. at 465.
115. See Smith, supra note 9, at 1153; Higginson, supra note 9, at 143 n.2.
116.

In Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S.

at 464, the Court saw the complaint as an attempt to use the First Amendment
as a source of a national labor relations law. Cf Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992); Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
117. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53.
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tions against devices that would prevent formation of a will of the
people reflecting the common good and based on transactions
among all citizens.
III.

AMENDMENT

2: ITS

ADOPTION AND INTERPRETATION

At this point, it might be useful to depart from historical or
case analysis to look briefly at a contemporary example of a Petitions Clause claim. The contemporary Petitions Clause claim
challenges a state constitutional provision popularly known in
Colorado as Amendment 2. Amendment 2 was added to the Colorado Constitution through the state's initiative process." 8
Amendment 2 states that neither the:
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall ... adopt or enforce
any . . . policy whereby homosexual ... orientation [or]
conduct.., shall.., be the basis of, or entitle any person
119
or class of persons to... any... claim of discrimination.
Arguments about the constitutionality of Amendment 2 involve
debates about the proper interpretation of a number of federal
120
constitutional provisions in addition to the Petitions Clause.
In the public mind, however, the arguments tend to boil down to
a confrontation between two views: (1) Amendment 2 is the
quintessentially legitimate product of direct, popular democracy
that countered government captured by a special interest group;
and (2) Amendment 2 excludes an unpopular minority from
118. In Colorado, proponents of an amendment to the state constitution
may have their proposal placed on the ballot at a general election if they can
obtain at least five percent of the total number of votes cast for the office of
Secretary of State at the previous election. COLO. CONSr. art. V, § 1. The
Colorado Constitution provides that the people are the sole and exclusive root
of sovereign power, and vests the people with the right of initiative,
independent of the general assembly, "solely for the good of the whole." CoLo.
CONST. art. II, § 1.
119. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 306.
120. These include the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the First Amendment (establishment of religion, petition, and
free speech clauses), and the Article IV, Section 4, guarantee of a republican
form of government. The Colorado District Court recently made the
preliminary injunction upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court in Evans v.
Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993), permanent. Evans v. Romer, No. 92 CV
7223, 1993 WL 518586 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14,1993). To date, arguments have
focused on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
fundamental right allegedly infringed is the right of political participation.
Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d at 1276. The plaintiffs' claims, however, are not
restricted to equality claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. They include a
claim based on the Petitions Clause of the First Amendment.
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normal political relationships and obstructs public debate and
decisionmaking about homosexuality.
Advocates both for and against Amendment 2 appeal to
ideas historically associated with the Petitions Clause. Indeed, if
one compares the public debate about Amendment 2 to the
1836 debate over the abolitionist petitions to Congress, one discerns some interesting parallels. Although the 1836 debate was
about whether government is required to accept and give full
consideration to petitions presented to it, and the Amendment 2
debate is about whether a majority of voters can disable government from responding to a particular type of petition even
should government want to respond, the similarities in the public debate are striking.
For example, just as Senator Calhoun and others argued
that abolitionist petitions should not be received because receipt
would be inherently divisive, 121 the state of Colorado argues that
Amendment 2 legitimately prevents the inherently divisive issue
of homosexuality from being formally presented to Colorado
government. 122 Just as Senator Calhoun argued that mere
receipt of the abolitionist petitions would lend inappropriate
credence to the substance of extremist views, 123 Amendment 2
proponents have argued that a statewide ban on non-discrimination policies is a necessary barrier to an extreme homosexual
24
Just as Senator Calhoun and others tried to impose a
agenda.'
limitation on what sort of grievances could be considered "legitimate" 12 5-an effort argued to be futile and ill-advised by Senator
6
2 effectively deems that some grievTallmadge 22-Amendment
ances do not exist.
121. See supra note 39.
122. Appellee's Opening Brief at 42-43. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270
(Colo. 1993) (No. 93SA17).
123. The most pointed argument to this effect is found at CONG. GLOBE
ApP., supra note 38, at 224-26 (arguing that receiving petitions gives an implied
pledge to give serious regard to the prayer for redress of grievances). See also id.
at 138, 220-22, and 292-93 (objection of other senators).
124. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Institute in Basic Life Principles at 19-22,
Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (No. 93SA17).
125. These efforts ranged from arguments that the petitions used
inappropriately offensive language and should therefore be excluded, CONG.
GLOBE, supra note 38, at 75, 80, 118, 335-37, to arguments that the grievances
were not personal to the petitioners id. at 76, 87, 118, 292, to arguments that
petitioners cannot ask for the exercise of powers not delegated to Congress, id.
at 75, 76, 80-81, 88; CONG. GLOBE App., supra note 38, at 299-300, 322.
126. For example, Senator Tallmadge argued that
grievances, so far as the right of petition is concerned, are to be
judged of by the petitioner himself. No power can prescribe rules by
which he is to judge of them; and to which his petition must conform.
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My initial reaction to Amendment 2 was that its most significant constitutional deficiency is its attempt to stop peaceful political and social change by interfering with and penalizing
speech.' 2 7 Amendment 2 creates disincentives and penalties for
You cannot lay him on the bed of Procrustes, and stretch out or lop off
his views, in order to conform them to your standard. He must have
his own standard . . . else his petition is not for the redress of those
grievances which he feels. His grievances may be imaginary, or they
may be real ....
Of this, he must be the sole judge, so far as the right
to ask redress is concerned; but, so far as redress ought to be granted,that
is to be judged of by those to whom the petition is addressed.
CONG. GioBR APP., supranote 38, at 110. For other arguments opposing various
notions of legitimacy, see id. at 88, 122, 134, 147, 148 (regarding the nature of
public grievances), and id. at 110, 123, 133-34, 183 (regarding petitions respecting powers not granted to Congress).
127. Emily Calhoun, Silence and the Elections of 1992, Arnoc., Vol. XIV, no.
5, at 13-14 (Colorado Women's Bar Association). The focus of my argument
was on that portion of Amendment 2 which prohibits recognition of claims of
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
By endorsing discrimination on the basis of homosexual orientation,
Amendment 2 puts persons who speak out in favor of equality-and
persons who identify themselves as . . . seeking equality-at risk of
becoming targets of discrimination in all aspects of life. Amendment
2 imposes a penalty on those who dare to speak out and acknowledge
their homosexual orientation ... [even if they do so] to seek repeal of
Amendment 2 through the initiative process. In fact, Amendment 2
puts people under pressure to falsely represent themselves and their
homosexual orientation.
Id.
My argument relied on cases like Merrick v. Board of Higher Educ., 841
P.2d 646 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (invalidating a statute that prohibited state officials from interfering with personnel actions against any state employee based
on that employee's sexual orientation on First Amendment grounds). According to the Oregon Court of Appeals:
Adverse employment decisions will not occur unless the employee's
sexual orientation comes to the employer's attention. A state
employee's sexual orientation will seldom become known to the
employee's supervisor unless the employee has chosen to "speak, write
or print" about it. If, on the other hand, employees never in any way
... communicate the nature of their sexual orientation to other people, it is highly unlikely that they would encounter discrimination on
that basis ....
Not only does the statute discourage state employees
from telling others their sexual orientation, it also discourages them
from becoming involved in groups advocating gay and lesbian rights, a
constitutionally protected activity, because such involvement might
expose them to adverse personnel action.
Id. at 650.
I also relied on West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
in which the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated a statute that
demanded a symbolic demonstration of national loyalty from school children.
The Court determined that government has no constitutional power to coerce
false representations of support from those unwilling to give it. Such attempts
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advocates of homosexual rights who dare to acknowledge their
sexual orientation or openly talk about homosexuality. I saw
Amendment 2 as simply the latest in a history of attempts by dogmatic groups to stop change 28by restricting speech, in this case
speech about homosexuality.'
A speech analysis casts doubt on the constitutional validity of
one aspect of Amendment 2, but the constitutional deficiencies
of the Amendment are not completely accounted for by a conventional free speech analysis. Amendment 2 is about something
more than speech. Amendment 2 adversely affects transactional
as well as speech interests. Amendment 2 is about a disabling of
government's ability to work for the common good of all of its
citizens or to assist all of its citizens to form pacts that they might
wish to form. It interferes with transactional interests protected
through the Petitions Clause by denying one group the opportunity to be taken into account as part of the common good. This
is arguably a deprivation of rights of citizenship.
The literal language of Amendment 2 suggests that appeals
to government to refrain from discriminating on the basis of
homosexual orientation 1 29 as well as appeals to government to
stop private persons from doing so1 3 0 are beyond the power of
Colorado government to grant. The state Attorney General
argues that Amendment 2 will have a more limited impact. She
asserts that the Amendment will only nullify existing state and
local laws or policies which prohibit discrimination based on
homosexual or bisexual orientation and ensure that state and
at "officially disciplined uniformity," 319 U.S. at 637, unconstitutionally deny
the freedom to be "intellectually and spriitually diverse." Id. at 641. Cf Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, reh'g denied, 323 U.S. 819 (1945) (statute objectionable
because it forced speakers to misrepresent their intent to solicit union

membership).
128. Compare the numerous attempts of white Southerners to protect
their way of racially segregated life by suppressing the First Amendment rights
of the NAACP, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(statute demanded the names of NAACP members); id. (argument that NAACP
lacked standing to assert constitutional rights of its members); NAACP v.

Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (statute prohibited NAACP from
doing business as a corporation). See also Higginson, supra note 9, at 163
(abolitionists argued that an official bar to receipt of petitions was an attempt to
stop change by taking a position before facts were known).
129. Arguably, government policies may not prevent, for instance, a
decision of a welfare office not to distribute benefits to a gay man or a decision
of a government official to fire a lesbian public employee.
130. Arguably, government policies may not prevent, for instance, a
decision of an apartment owner not to rent to homosexuals, of an employer not
to hire homosexuals, or of an insurance company not to insure gay men.
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131
local authorities cannot adopt new laws or policies of that sort.

According to the Attorney General's analysis, the guiding intent
and ultimate goal behind Amendment 2 "was not to deprive
homosexuals or bisexuals of any constitutionally guaranteed
rights, but to remove any state-based grounds for putting such
individuals in a more favorable position vis-a-vis other
32
citizens."
Despite disagreements on some points, it seems clear that
Amendment 2 invalidates existing local legislation prohibiting
discrimination against homosexuals and would, therefore, presumably bar any similar legislation in the future. 33 For this reason, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a preliminary
injunction to prevent Amendment 2 from going into effect pending a trial on the merits of constitutional claims.
The Colorado Supreme Court based its decision on a belief
that Amendment 2 likely infringes a fundamental right to equal
political participation. Citing reapportionment cases, cases protecting minority party rights, cases invalidating restrictions on the
franchise, and cases involving attempts to limit the ability of certain groups to have desired legislation implemented through the
normal political processes, 134 the Court determined that "the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States constitution protects the fundamental right to participate equally in the political
process, and that any legislation or state constitutional amendment which infringes on that right ... must be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny."3 5
The court's reasoning is not convincing to me as a matter of
conventional equal protection doctrine."16 Only the First
131.

Appellant's Opening Brief at 16, Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270

(Colo. 1993) (No. 93SA17).

132.
133.

Id.
See the discussion of non-discrimination ordinances adopted by the

cities of Aspen, Boulder, and Denver; the non-discrimination policy adopted by
the Denver Public Schools; the non-discrimination personnel policy adopted by
the Governor of Colorado; the non-discrimination policies adopted by
Metropolitan State College of Denver and Colorado State University; and the
statute restricting insurance companies from basing insurability on sexual
orientation, in LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
RESEARCH PUB. No. 369, AN ANALYSIS OF 1992 BALLOT PROPOSALS 15 (1992).
134. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d at 1277-79.
135. Id. at 1282. See generally id. at 1276-82.
136. The Supreme Court decisions most closely on point cannot easily be
explained as calling for strict scrutiny any time any group is told to pursue their
interests through some special process of democratic decisionmaking. See a
number of descriptions of the analytical problem: Eule, supra note 11, at 156164, 1576-77; Calhoun, supra note 1, at 565; and Hsiao, supra note 26, at 1287. In
Evans v. Romer, Justice Erickson, who could not find a principled basis for
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Amendment provides the fundamental right that warrants strict
scrutiny in voting rights cases brought by groups other than
racial minorities."' It also provides the right, through the Petitions Clause, that may warrant invalidation of Amendment 2.
There are a number of ways in which Amendment 2 might
violate the Petitions Clause. Without undertaking an extended
constitutional analysis, let me describe a few Petitions
Clause dif138
ficulties suggested by the previous discussion.
First, Amendment 2 is intended to be-and is taken as-a
statement about the citizenship rights of one group of persons. 3 9 The Amendment 2 debate is a replay of the 1836 debate
about receipt of abolitionist petitions in one critical respect. Just
as the opponents of the abolitionist petitions knew that mere
receipt of the petitions would be seen as an acknowledgment that
African-Americans enjoyed a status fundamentally at odds with
slavery, so the proponents of Amendment 2 know that if they can
deny homosexuals access to normal government channels they
have severely compromised the standing of homosexuals as citizens. Under Amendment 2, homosexuals owe a duty to accede
to the exercise of government powers conferred for the benefit
of the common good 14but
are deprived of reciprocal rights of
0
access to government.

subjecting the Amendment to strict scrutiny, also perceived the analytical
difficulty. 854 P.2d at 1286, 1293-1302 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
137. In fact, the court's discussion of these cases emphasizes their First
Amendment elements.
138. My purpose in this Article is not to construct a constitutional brief
against Amendment 2's validity, although I do believe that Amendment 2
violates the First Amendment. My purpose here is simply to use Amendment 2
to illustrate how a Petitions Clause analysis raises questions about government
structures that are not necessarily objectionable under either free speech or
equal protection principles. In the following section which sets forth a proposal
for a Petitions Clause analysis, see infra part IV, constitutional issues are further
discussed.
139. The discrimination that Amendment 2 validates affects citizens in
many ways. Denver police officers have refused to provide assistance or backup
to a fellow officer on a high risk call. Appellee's Answer Brief at 7, Evans v.
Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (No. 93SA17). The enforcement of
Amendment 2 would allow insurance underwriters to refuse coverage on the
basis of sexual orientation. Id. at 15. Amendment 2 effectuates the complete
disenfranchisement of homosexuals by "denying them the ability to participate
in the political process at all levels and before all branches of local and state
government." Id. at 16. This occurs because Amendment 2 requires "gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals, but no other group in Colorado, to amend the state
constitution before they could meaningfully petition for any administrative or
legislative relief from discrimination." Id. at 19.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25. That homosexuals are
deprived of access to demonstrate their need for protection against
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Amendment 2 also precludes the ability of "the people" to
form pacts among themselves.' 41 Consider, for example, communities that want to be able to adopt policies believed to promote the general welfare of all citizens, including homosexuals.
As the local communities of Aspen, Boulder, and Denver have
been told, they are disabled from adopting such policies.' 42 At
the state level, only the direct democracy, initiative route arguably remains open to those seeking policies that promote the general welfare of all citizens, including homosexuals. The initiative
process, inherently private, is not oriented to decisionmaking for
the common good that transcends special interests. 4 ' Moreover, Amendment 2 makes it substantially less likely that an initiative reflecting the common good will ever be put before the
voters. The disincentives for speech about homosexuality make
it unlikely that good and reliable information about homosexuals, the reality of their lives or their interests, will gain entry to
discrimination, a grievance that is by definition relates to their personal status
rather than, simply, to some general policy question of interest to a crosssection of the citizenry, highlights the nature of Amendment 2's prohibition.
141. Amendment 2 also makes it difficult for homosexuals to form pacts
with each other and thereby erects barriers to full citizenship. See supra notes
48-51 and accompanying text (discussing the isolating means used by
slaveholders to maintain subjugation of slaves); supra notes 125, 127-28, 131-33
and accompanying text (discussing how Amendment 2 penalizes and creates
disincentives for speech and association).
142. See supra note 131. Some of the entities affected by Amendment 2
have resorted to circuitous means to try to avoid excluding homosexuals from
those entitled to be taken into account as part of the general welfare. For
example, the University of Colorado has adopted a policy which requires all
decisions to be based on merit. Even if Amendment 2 arguably leaves such
indirect openings for people to form pacts, Amendment 2 precludes
homosexuals from naming their own grievances. See supra note 120 (discussing
the efforts of Southerners to restrict how abolitionists might state their
grievances); supra notes 22-25 (the nature of the equitable principles with
which petitioning and the trusteeship concept of government are associated is
to permit people to work within the interstices of formally-approved legal
norms). Under those circumstances, any pacts made will be unsatisfactory. Cf
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, reh'g denied, 323 U.S. 819 (1945) (the Petitions
Clause protects the right of people to openly and without indirection or
misrepresentation state what they are after); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) (restraints on judicial petitions must give plenty of
leeway for grievants to articulate their problems as they see them).
143. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 301. According to Mansbridge, in
direct democracy, citizens file into a voting booth and cast a secret ballot for
which they do not have to be publicly accountable. As she says, "small wonder
that the preferences so conceived and so expressed should tend toward the
private and the selfish." Id. In Colorado, polls taken before the election at
which Amendment 2 was adopted showed a majority of citizens in opposition to
the Amendment. Perhaps Mansbridge's observ'ations explain why the election
results were at odds with what the polls indicated.
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public debate and pave the way for change in public policy
respecting homosexuals
and their relationships to the general
44
community.1

Finally, Amendment 2 sends a message about government
accountability that is at odds with the requirements of the charter for government. As the Supreme Court has recently said in
another context, government may not be structured so as to send
a message to elected officials that they need only represent one
constituent group. 45 Amendment 2 does precisely that.
Amendment 2 tells government officials that they do not have
the power or authority to respond to the demands of one constituent group. They are told that, although they may represent the
interests of felons as felons or rich people as rich people, they
may not represent homosexuals as homosexuals. If homosexuals
ask to have their group interests included in discussions of government policy, officials may simply respond that Amendment 2
limits their ability to take those interests into account. Thus,
government officials are relieved of political pressures that would
otherwise exist to respond
to demands for policy appropriate to
46
demonstrated need. 1

A speech analysis does not adequately respond to these features of Amendment 2. Only an analysis that looks at the nonadversarial transactional interests protected by the Petitions
Clause-and at the impact of measures like Amendment 2 on the
charter for government secured by that provision-suffices.
IV.

A

PROPOSAL FOR PETITIONS CLAUSE ANALYSIS

My proposal is intended to provide a constitutional home
for claims alleging that government structures prevent some citizens from being part of transactions that forge pacts for the common good. It takes seriously Alexander Meiklejohn's argument
that, to work for the common good, a government must be able
to proceed in ways that do not mutilate a community thinking
process. It also takes seriously the idea that a government ceded
power so that it may act for the common good must guarantee all
144.
145.

See supra notes 124-25, 127-28.
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993) (discussing the validity of

messages that elected representatives need be concerned only about citizens of
one race).
146. Because of Amendment 2, information becomes useless to persons
who might otherwise be able to demonstrate a need for policies against
discrimination. Similarly, information becomes unnecessary to those who
oppose such policies. Opponents of non-discrimination policies need only
invoke Amendment 2 to effectively foreclose legislative debate.
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citizens a meaningful opportunity to be included in the formulation of pacts and policies for the common good.
My proposal focuses on characteristics of government structures which, if absent or compromised significantly, signal that
the Petitions Clause charter for government may have been violated. Under the proposal, an ultimate judgment of unconstitutionality would depend on a qualitative appraisal of all factors
and would turn on assessments of "proximity and degree"147
rather than application of a bright-line rule or formula.
The proposal builds on ideas embodied in the Supreme
Court's Petitions Clause opinions and on arguments historically
associated with the Petitions Clause, but focuses on non-adversarial transactional interests. It is intended to identify instances
in which government has been deprived of the ability to respond
to adversarial speech in ways that serve the non-adversarial transactional interests protected by the Petitions Clause charter for
government. 148
The proposal is concerned with a corruption of decisionmaking processes.1 49 Corruption in the Petitions Clause sense
consists of something more than mere disruption and disturbance of processes, something more than a refusal of government to respond to a particular group's advocacy, and something
more even than attempts to penalize people who ask government
to respond. The proposal has a procedural orientation, but it
should not be thought of as embodying merely a special type of

147.

Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 296.

148. The proposal's focus should not be interpreted to preclude Petitions
Clause protection for speech interests. As the Court's Petitions Clause opinions
attest, equal speech access is an important precondition to government's ability
to form pacts for the common good. The adversarial reality of the political
process-the origin of pacts for the common good in the vigorous statement of
adversarial interests-cannot be ignored as part of political transactions. A
Petitions Clause analysis that focused on transactional interests only as they
pertain to the common good would pose dangers equal to those that arise from
an analysis that focuses on speech alone. See, e.g., Mansbridge, supra note 26, at
261 (demanding action for the common good, or consensus, can be silencing
in itself and can inappropriately mask conflict).
Compare arguments that First Amendment/free speech doctrine generally
should move away from the marketplace metaphor in, for example, Owen M.
Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 Yale L.J. 2087 (1991), and Owen M.
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405 (1986). My argument
for an augmenting, rather than a substitutive move, finds support in and
pertains only to the Petitions Clause.
149. See supra notes 217-28 and accompanying text.
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due process analysis. A Petitions Clause claim is about abridgments of citizenship, not mere procedural inadequacy."'
Processes that are corrupt in the Petitions Clause sense have
two essential characteristics: (1) they disable government from
assisting citizens to form pacts for the common good and, as a
result, (2) they fracture the reciprocal relationship between government and citizen. Processes that are corrupt implicitly reject
the possibility that people with different interests can and will
form pacts. Corrupt processes are premised on an assumption
that the people always speak adversarially and only to promote
special (majoritarian or non-majoritarian) interests. In other
words, corrupt processes are fundamentally at odds with the normative premises of the Petitions Clause charter for
government.'
Many of the Supreme Court's constitutional voting rights
decisions-which I believe are best explained in First Amendment terms-support this approach to the concept of corruption. For example, although vote dilution decisions have come
to be seen as standing only for the proposition that minority
groups are entitled to an opportunity to elect representatives of
their choice, they actually stand for a slightly broader proposition. Consider White v. Regester.'52 In White, the Court held that
multi-member districts are not per se unconstitutional1 53 and
that no constitutional claim exists simply because minorities cannot elect representatives.1 5 4 Rather, an inability to participate in
the political process-shown by evidence that minorities have
long suffered discriminatory treatment in education and other
government services 55 and that representatives are insufficiently
responsive to minority interestS156-is the crux of the constitutional claim. Although a variety of factors showed an inability to
150. Cf Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); American Constitutional
Law Found. v. Meyer, No. 93-1467 (D. Colo. filed July 14, 1993).
151. The proposal is not based on an argument that government has a
duty to respond to petitioners, a duty advocated in Hodgkiss, supra note 9, at
574-75, and Higginson, supra note 9, at 155; and disputed in Smith, supra note
9, at 1190-91. I do not argue that government has such a duty and can be
forced to base its policy on pacts responding to the interests of all citizens. I
only argue that government cannot be forced to relinquish the power and
structures that enable its citizens to form pacts for the common good.
152. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
153. Id. at 765.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 768.
156. Id. at 769.
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participate in White, an absence of government reciprocity was an
important part of the equation.' 5 7
Rogers v. Lodge 5 a also makes the point. In Rogers, AfricanAmerican plaintiffs challenged at-large county elections. Almost
fifty-four percent of county residents belonged to the plaintiffs'
minority group.1 59 The Supreme Court upheld a district court
determination that African-Americans were deprived of an
opportunity to participate in the political process in part because
"[vloting along racial lines allows those elected to ignore black
interests without fear of political consequences. .. . "" AfricanAmericans were discriminated against in education,' 6 ' and "in
the selection of grand jurors, the hiring of county employees,
and in the appointments to boards and committees which oversee the county government."1 62 There was extensive evidence
that "elected officials ...have been unresponsive and insensitive
to the needs of the black community ... ."6 At-large elections,

not unconstitutional per se, were "subverted to invidious
1 64
purposes.

1

The importance of reciprocity and responsiveness is emphasized in Davis v. Bandemer,16 5 a non-racial gerrymandering decision. In Davis, a majority of Justices discussed a voting rights
claim within the framework of an equal protection concept of
"fair and effective representation." 66 One of the primary concerns of the two blocs ofJustices that comprised a voting majority
was the way in which representatives acted toward the constituents claiming a violation of voting rights.
157. In fact, in Bexar County, Texas, where Mexican-Americans
constituted almost a majority of county residents, it was arguably the most
important part of the equation for a court. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704
(W.D. Tex. 1972) (three-judge court), affd in part and revd in part sub nom.
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
158. 458 U.S. 613, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 899 (1982).
159. Id. at 614.
160. Id. at 623.
161. Id. at 624.
162. Id. at 625.
163. Id. In footnote 9, the Court said that evidence of "unresponsiveness"
might be used to imply discriminatory purpose, id. (quoting Lodge v. Buxton,
639 F.2d 1358, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981)), but in the vote dilution cases-which
repeatedly disavow finding constitutional harm in at-large elections or multimember districts per se, or in the mere inability of minority groups to elect
representatives-the evidence seems also to go to the lack of an opportunity to
participate in political processes.
164. Id. at 622 (quoting App. toJuris. Statement 71a).
165. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
166. Id. at 170 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Speaking for three Justices, Justice White said that the constitution protects against a diminished ability of constituent
groups "to secure the attention of the winning candidate," 6 7 but
he was not willing to presume that "those who are elected will
disregard a disproportionately [under] represented group."1 68 In
order to show a violation of voting rights under the equal protection clause, the complaining constituent group would have to
produce some evidence that the electoral system "is arranged in
a manner that will consistently degrade . . .influence on the
political process as a whole."' 6 9
Justices Powell and Stevens had the same central concern
voiced by Justice White, but they were a little less willing to presume that elected officials would take into account all constituent groups. They argued that the determination of "fair and
effective representation" should turn on several factors. They
would have asked whether the challenged political structure
interfered with the ability of citizens to associate effectively for
purposes of democratic government.1 70 They asserted that artificially gerrymandered communities would interfere with the ability of citizens to associate.1 7 ' They would also have asked
whether the process that produced the challenged decisionmaking structure was private. In Davis, Republicans had caucused
outside the legislature to draw up the challenged apportionment
scheme and then had presented it, without public hearing, to the
legislature for enactment by the Republican majority. This was
of concern to them. Finally, they would have asked whether the
challenged decisionmaking structure would be seen by the electorate as serving a "public purpose,"' 72 as taking into account the
"public interest in a fair electoral process,"' 73 or, in contrast, as
simple manipulation of the electorate or a game to see who is
kept in power. They believed this inquiry was important to
ensure that voters would not be disillusioned by the structures
of
174
government and fail to participate in democratic processes.
The concerns for reciprocity and responsiveness evidenced
in White, Rogers, and Davis are echoed elsewhere. For example, in
167. Id. at 133.
168. Id. at 132 (people who vote for a losing candidate are "usually
deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as
much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district").
169. Id.
170. Id. at 173.
171. Id. at 173 n.13.
172. Id. at 177.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 177-78.
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special district voting rights decisions like Ball v. James,1 75 the
Court has seemed willing to permit some district residents to be
excluded from the franchise because of the correspondingly limited powers of special districts.' 7 6 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,1" the
Court stated that the pernicious aspect of the challenged racial
gerrymander was that it "deprive[d] the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, including,
inter alia, the right to vote in municipal elections."178 In Shaw v.
Reno, 179 the Court linked the plaintiffs' harm to the fact that a
majority-minority district constructed solely on the basis of race
would send the unconstitutional message to the district representatives that they need only represent one, racially-defined part
of the district constituency rather than the entire community.1 80
A constitutional concern for reciprocity-responsiveness and
the ability of citizens to form pacts for the common good may be
addressed by expanding Petitions Clause analysis beyond its
focus on free speech. Petitions Clause protections should guard
against government processes that are corrupt because they disable government from assisting citizens to form pacts for the
common good and, as a result, fracture the reciprocal relationship between government and citizen. Although Petitions Clause
protections against corrupt government processes may be
needed only rarely, we should not forget that, when needed, they
are available.
175.
176.
177.
178.

451 U.S. 355 (1981).
See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 571-74.
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Id. at 341. Gomillion is typically interpreted only as a Fifteenth

Amendment-deprivation of vote-decision, but the language of the Court
clearly indicates that the plaintiffs' concerns were much broader than simply
the right to vote. But see Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60
(1978)

(persons

living

outside

municipal

boundaries,

but

subject

to

extraterritorial municipal police jurisdiction, claimed a right to vote in
municipal elections). In Holt, the majority rejected the claim, over the
objections of dissenters who argued that:
[a] t the heart of our basic conception of a "political community".. . is
the notion of a reciprocal relationship between the process of
government and those who subject themselves to that process by
choosing to live within the area of its authoritative application ....
[The extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Tuscaloosa] fracture[s]

this relationship by severing the connection between the process of
government and those who are governed in the places of their
residency....
Id. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
344 (1972)).
179. 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).
180. Id. at 2827.

19941

VOICE IN GOVERNMENT: THE PEOPLE
CONCLUSION

Although some would have us believe otherwise, people do
want to form pacts among themselves for the common good.
That desire, exploited and given an opportunity to be realized by
Martin Luther King, Jr., gave the civil rights movement of the
1960s its power. 8 ' People can and will form pacts for the common good if they are not precluded from doing so.
No one needs principles that can never be realized and so
operate as dysfunctional myth' 82 or principles that only obscure
reality, 18 3 but we must not forget that we live our political lives in
spheres of both aspiration and reality.' 8 4 As aspirants, we should
not tolerate structures fundamentally at odds with the aspirational principle that very different people are able, through government, to form pacts for the common good.' 85 We should not
tolerate structures that prevent us from any possibility of realizing our aspirations. Precisely because the aspiration is so freneed a constitution
quently obscured by adversarial politics, 1we
86
principle.
aspirational
the
for
that stands
The Petitions Clause charter for government, more than any
other provision of the Bill of Rights, makes evident the interest
which we all have in the protection of citizenship rights of other
people. The Petitions Clause is a charter for government for all
the people. Rights of political participation are not of concern
merely to minority groups. They are important to all of us who,
as citizens, wish not to be precluded from entering into transactions and pacts with other citizens for the benefit of our common
181.

See Feldman, supra note 7, at 1867-68.

182. See

MANSBRIDGE,

supra note 26, at 295.

183. See Emily Calhoun, Shaw v. Reno: On the Borderline, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 137 (1993).
184. As one of the reportedly significant influences on Martin Luther
King, Jr., noted, political strategies should be measured by two criteria: (1)
whether they "[d]o justice to the moral resources and possibilities in human
nature and provide for the exploitation of every latent moral capacity in man,"
and (2) whether they "take account of the limitations of human nature,
particularly those which manifest themselves in man's collective behavior."
REINHARD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SocIETY at xxiv-xxv (1932).
185. Cf Michelman, supra note 2, at 1527-28 (we should hold out the
possibility of government for the common good).
186. Constitutional aspirations are not a trivial aspect of the charter for
government, for they can have tangible consequences for how representatives
act. See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 139, 163, 182, 261 (an ideology about
representative capacity re all the people serves the end itself); Feldman, supra
note 7, at 1867-68 (we need to preserve the aspiration in order to promote
behavior). Because there is little one can do to force representatives to act for
the common good, no matter what government structure is adopted, the
aspiration is all the more important.
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good. They are important to all of us who, as citizens, wish to
protect the speech of each as a means of securing a voice of all.

